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THE SWEET 
ALLURE OF 
THEORY
Helen Petrovsky
Profanations by Giorgio 
Agamben, trans. Jeff Fort. 
New York: Zone Books, 2007. 
Pp. 100. $25.95 cloth.
Giorgio Agamben’s recent book, 
Profanations, unites seemingly dis-
parate essays. However, even with-
out being a student of his work, one 
may single out a certain key theme 
that runs across different disciplin-
ary domains, including philosophy, 
literature (and literary criticism), 
and studies of the visual. I would 
defi ne this theme as the composition 
of the subject. Indeed, the very fi rst 
essay in Agamben’s new book intro-
duces readers to this problematic 
by describing the tense and even 
dramatic relationship between a 
person’s Ego and his Genius, the 
symbolic bearer and representation 
of his fate. This is a fi eld of forces 
shaping each and every individual 
when the personal is simultaneously 
maintained and challenged by the 
secret strength of the impersonal. 
Such is physiological life, which, de-
spite its striking closeness, remains 
distant, nonconscious, and, for that 
reason, out of control. Such are 
the workings of emotion, which, 
according to the theorist Gilbert 
Simondon, is precisely a way of 
relating to what remains of the pre-
individual within us. Agamben 
clearly formulates the paradox: “Ge-
nius is our life insofar as it does not 
belong to us” (13)—in other words, 
insofar as it does not come into our 
possession.
However, this other life is not 
a matter of the individual alone. 
In the essay titled “Special Being” 
the author seems to extend his own 
initial defi nition. “Special,” a word 
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deriving from the Latin species (“ap-
pearance,” “aspect,” “vision”), stands 
for a quality being displayed; it 
is a mode of being that essentially 
calls for sharing (or, in Agamben’s 
terminology, offers itself “to com-
mon use” [59]). Since such being, 
also defi ned as “whatever being” 
(58), adheres to each of its qualities 
but is not identifi ed by them, it re-
mains insubstantial. That is, it is not 
a substance, but a desire for the 
species of another, for its “habits” or 
“ways” that reveal its perseverance 
in its being—such is the clue to the 
understanding of a being that, to 
recall Jean-Luc Nancy, is a priori 
“in common.” Although culture in-
cessantly reduces the special to the 
personal and thus invests it with 
identity, special being cannot be an 
object of personal property. Identity 
is itself a powerful cultural appara-
tus. (Agamben here uses the Italian 
word dispositivo, which brings to 
mind Michel Foucault and his con-
cept of biopower.)
Therefore, the subject as it is 
defi ned and formed by impersonal 
forces shares this composition with 
others. Although Agamben does not 
further dwell on his version of “be-
ing in common,” he goes on to 
elaborate the specifi c relationship 
between the personal and the imper-
sonal by addressing the very nature 
of the boundary that separates the 
sacred from the profane. At this point 
the relationship in question, full of 
ambiguity, becomes truly dynamic. 
It is epitomized in the fi gure of 
homo sacer, a “sacred man,” who has 
survived the very rite of separation: 
belonging to the gods, he continues 
to lead an obviously profane exis-
tence among his fellow men. How-
ever, his communication with other 
men is fatally damaged. His position 
is such that they may violently kill 
him (restoring him, thus, to the 
realm of the gods), and yet he cannot 
be sacrifi ced, because he is no longer 
part of the community. In sum, “in 
the machine of sacrifi ce, sacred and 
profane represent the two poles of a 
system in which a fl oating signifi er 
travels from one domain to the oth-
er without ceasing to refer to the 
same object” (78). For Agamben, 
this is a question of use. Indeed, re-
ligion in general is about separating 
things, places, humans, or animals 
from their habitual functions and of 
putting them to a use that is conse-
crated and, as such, uncommon.
Let us linger here for a moment, 
especially since this thread of analy-
sis results in Agamben’s formulat-
ing an open political task. In the 
essay “In Praise of Profanation,” 
which actually lends its name to the 
book, profanation is seen as a way of 
not only neutralizing the sacred (the 
best example is provided by play) 
but also of deactivating those appa-
ratuses of power that, as I would 
put it, capitalize on the separation 
installed and maintained by religion. 
Again, and even more clearly, it is a 
question of use. Profanation seeks 
to reestablish a “common use” (77) 
of previously excluded spaces and 
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objects. Such use has nothing to do 
with consumption. On the contrary, 
it indicates a relationship with some-
thing one can never actually “have” 
or “possess”: things freed from their 
very functionality. Concerning be-
havior, the new use would mean 
extracting it “from its genetic in-
scription within a given sphere” 
(85; the cat playing with a ball of 
yarn, for example); in other words, 
it would amount to transforming 
activity into “a pure means” (86). The 
old use, utilitarian and/or geneti-
cally preinscribed, therefore becomes 
“inoperative.” Hence the political 
task of profaning the unprofanable, 
which is marked by its absolute 
separation in the form of consump-
tion or “spectacular exhibition” (82), 
the twin aspects of the capitalist re-
ligion ubiquitously reigning in our 
time.
The concept developed in this 
essay is heavily infl uenced by Jean-
Luc Nancy and his notion of “inop-
erative community.” “Inoperative” 
is the English word for désoeuvré, 
which literally means “out of work.” 
Nancy adopts the term from Mau-
rice Blanchot and highlights pre-
cisely the overtones of idleness that 
it carries; in his philosophical refl ec-
tion, a “nonworking” community 
is that which has neither identity 
nor substance, and does not “betray” 
itself in institutional forms. The 
political stakes for addressing the 
issue are high. How is it still possible 
to speak (or think) of the revolution 
and communism at a moment when 
both seem to have been completely 
discredited? Yet there is something 
about human existence that these 
phenomena tend to display: an ini-
tial connectedness, a being that is by 
defi nition shared with the others. 
Thus communism will always be a 
manifestation of some basic truth 
concerning ontological togetherness. 
The examples that Giorgio Agam-
ben gives (more than twenty years 
after Nancy’s initial publication of 
La communauté désoeuvrée) within 
a slightly modifi ed theoretical 
framework are somewhat discon-
certing. They are the possibility of 
“profane defecation” and the brazen 
faces of porn stars regarded as the 
site for a “new form of erotic com-
munication” (90). (One can hardly 
imagine the consequences of return-
ing feces, even if only a symbol, to 
“common use” [87].) What accounts 
for this apparent lowering of politi-
cal stakes? Is it simply due to a shift 
in the theme, or does it not show 
signs of dominant theory becoming 
more modest and docile, if not to say 
opportunistic, these days?
What has been alluded to as the 
impersonal in the composition of 
subjectivity is elsewhere rendered as 
life. This is made clear by Agam-
ben’s analysis of Foucault’s study of 
the lives of infamous men. Although 
the passage is meant to elucidate 
another concept, that of the death of 
the author, it deserves independent 
attention. What is of special interest 
to Agamben is the point of inter-
section between actual lives and 
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the discourse of anonymous scribes 
whose task it was to register them. 
This relationship is not one of repre-
sentation, to be sure. In Foucault’s 
words, the real lives were “played 
out” (jouées) in the few sentences 
that gave them legal expression.1 
Taking on the ambiguous word 
“jouer,” Agamben tries to work out 
the ways in which life reverberates 
in discourse. The infamous life that 
belongs neither to juridical identity 
nor to the functionaries of power “is 
never possessed, never represented, 
never said” (68). Instead, it is that 
“inexpressive outer edge” (70) that 
makes expression possible precisely 
by emptying the core of this expres-
sion. This holds true for the author 
as gesture. And this holds true for 
the poem insofar as the author and 
reader put themselves into play in 
the text and likewise are withdrawn 
from it. The recurrence to life allows 
Agamben to sketch out the begin-
nings of an ethics: the latter is tight-
ly linked to a life form whose ethos 
coincides with perseverance in its 
being.
A life, any life, life in general 
played out—that is, lived at its ut-
most and for that reason remaining 
inexpressible—is what makes ex-
pression possible. The essay “Paro-
dy” can be read as complementary to 
“The Author as Gesture.” Here 
Agamben explores the potential of 
parody both as literary genre and 
what is referred to in terms of a 
“duplication of being” (49). Parody, 
etymologically meaning a space 
beside or next to the song (reserved 
for speech or, more broadly, for lan-
guage), is the only way of approach-
ing a mystery, while the latter is the 
only possible emblem of life. At least 
this is what is suggested by the prose 
of Elsa Morante. Parody is not only 
a means of reconstructing an unnar-
ratable object such as the innocent 
life, but is also a form and practice 
that is essentially liminal: it sustains 
itself “on the threshold of literature” 
and is “stubbornly suspended be-
tween reality and fi ction, between 
word and thing” (48). As such, it 
constitutes a split in language, some-
thing that points to its outer dimen-
sion. Modeled on the ancient defi ni-
tion of parody, this space is called 
“the being-beside-itself” (49) and has 
to do with every living being as well 
as every discourse. To put it differ-
ently, parody indicates the limits 
of language, its inability to reach 
the thing through the procedure 
of naming, and yet, one might 
conclude, there is nothing more 
real than the thing that calls for 
expression.
The two other themes that I 
would single out are desire and 
messianic time. Perhaps they end
up being one and the same or at 
least combining into a fairly distinct 
problematic. This problematic is in-
troduced by means of the fi gure of 
the helper, of which literature gives 
abundant examples. Franz Kafka’s 
compelling “assistants,” the famous 
puppet Pinocchio, helpers of the 
Messiah in the Arabic tradition, and 
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Walter Benjamin’s hunchback are 
the favored few of these examples. 
What is it that unites all of these 
incongruous beings? First of all, it 
must be said that they belong to “a 
complementary world.” Access to 
this world is more than problematic 
(“they cannot be helped” [30], but, 
most important, help is not their 
forte). Second, they perform a reve-
lation. If in the case of wuzara’ (the 
plural of wasir, the vizier) it is liter-
ally about translating the divine 
language into the language of men, 
the little hunchback in Benjamin 
appears as spokesman of the forgot-
ten. What he represents is that “on-
tological waste” (35) that we carry in 
ourselves and that fails to surface in 
memory or consciousness. However, 
it is by remaining forgotten that the 
insignifi cant tissue of our lives may 
be redeemed. For Benjamin, the 
Kingdom is already present, albeit 
in despicable and distorted forms. 
The helpers, then, are nothing but 
“our unfulfi lled desires” (34), which 
will shine back on us on Judgment 
Day.2
The other medium that Agam-
ben chooses for his speculations on 
time is, quite predictably, photogra-
phy. The essay that explores the 
theme is characteristically titled 
“Judgment Day.” Although there is 
no explicit mention of the nature of 
the photograph, it turns out that it 
resides in the gesture. The gesture 
here may be interpreted as the 
“monogram” of a person, of his or 
her entire life.3 A gesture reproduced 
in the photo may be mundane and 
banal; however, because of the inter-
vention of the camera, it assumes an 
eschatological meaning: what is cap-
tured in its historicity and singular-
ity is displayed as if on Judgment 
Day itself. According to this read-
ing, it would seem that “the angel of 
photography” (24) unites the two 
modes of time by way of a rupture. 
Indeed, the photograph is “the site 
of a gap . . . between the sensible and 
the intelligible, between copy and 
reality, between a memory and a 
hope” (26). Messianic time thus 
imprinted in the image corresponds 
to the exigency emitted by every 
photograph: it demands that all for-
gotten lives should be named and 
remembered.
This temporal sketch inspired by 
Walter Benjamin is essentially an-
other take on the impersonal, this 
time from an ethical perspective. We 
are interpellated by that which we 
do not possess, which goes beyond 
the boundaries of time and lived 
experience. I would call this the 
exigency of life, and if I am right in 
my interpretation, I do share the 
overall message. In fact, one can 
hardly disagree with the various 
thoughts and insights collected in 
Profanations, the more so that they 
are rendered poetically, in a lyrical 
tone. But a strange shadow hovers 
over this intimacy. The reader is 
lulled into a sweet contemplation of 
varying cultural texts and phenom-
ena. And it seems that theory itself 
quietly transforms into a bagatelle. 
152 HELEN PETROVSKY
What are the risks involved in the 
present undertaking? What is the 
“outer edge” of the sophisticated 
form it adopts? Is the community 
whose echo it presumably articulates 
inclusive or exclusive? The book 
provides no answers to those ques-
tions, even if the problems that it 
touches on are clearly acute.
—Institute of Philosophy, 
Russian Academy of Sciences
NOTES
1. See Michel Foucault, “Lives of 
Infamous Men,” in Power, ed. James 
D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley 
(New York: New Press, 2000), 160 
(translation emended).
2. For a direct connection between desires 
and their fulfi llment at the end of time, 
see the short essay “Desiring” in 
Agamben’s Profanations.
3. Monogram is a term that comes from 
Siegfried Kracauer. He juxtaposes the 
“last image” of a person’s life as 
memory retains it to the photograph, 
which represents only a set of scattered 
fragments related to that human being.
